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THE LIBOR SCANDAL: A NEED FOR REVISED
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REFORMS AND
REGULATIONS

by
Roy J. Girasa*
Richard J. Kraus**

INTRODUCTION
Few individuals or even major investors are aware of the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a little-known
activity that profoundly affects local and world finances. The
total value of securities and loans affected by LIBOR is
approximately $800 trillion dollars annually. In contrast, the
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately $69.65
trillion dollars and the US GDP is around $15 trillion. Until the
global economy suffered a great loss commencing in 2007,
little attention was paid to the gross LIBOR abuses by banks,
securities firms, and other financial institutions in the financial
markets. This article examines the LIBOR rate manipulation
which has led to investigations by the United States
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA).
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Significant fines were assessed by these governmental
agencies. Civil lawsuits by affected legal persons also resulted.
This article concludes that, in the absence of responsible
actions by financial businesses, antifraud regulations must be
strengthened and enforced, even though the manner and
mechanisms of such regulations have not yet been finalized.
LIBOR: THE SELF-DETERMINED INTERBANK
INTEREST RATE
LIBOR establishes the interest rate that banks charge each
other for short term loans. It indicates the average rate that a
LIBOR contributor bank would have to pay to obtain
unsecured funding in the London interbank market for a
designated time frame in reasonable market size for a given
maturity in a given currency. It is set by the British Bankers
Association (BBA) each business day between 11:00am and
11:10am London time. Each of the designated contributor
banks is asked the question: “At what rate could you borrow
funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to
11:00am?” It is the lowest rate that would be charged to the
particular bank given its credit and liquidity risk profile. It is
also the perceived rate because as the contributor bank need not
have actually borrowed unsecured funds from other banks. The
LIBOR rates are quoted based on annualized interest rates
which can vary significantly for a particular bank borrowing
funds on a particular date.
LIBOR rates are important because they assist setting rates
for a wide range of financial products from pensions to fixed
and adjustable mortgage rates, currencies, mutual funds, and
derivatives. 1
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The British Bankers Association (BBA) name does not
disclose the fact that the Association is composed of 18 “panel
banks” from all over the globe. The banks, setting the rates
since 1986, are selected based on their scale of market activity,
credit rating, and perceived expertise in the particular currency
utilized by them. For example, the following banks are the
Association’s contributor banks for the US Dollar: Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ
Ltd, Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays Bank plc, Rabobank,
BNP Paribas, Royal Bank of Canada, Citibank NA, Societe
Generale, Credit Agricole CIB, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking
Corporation, Credit Suisse, Norinchukin Bank, Deutsche Bank
AG, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, HSBC, and UBS AG.2
Each day at noon London time, the BBA agent Thompson
Reuters distributes maturity rates globally to approximately
300,000 recipients with respect to five currencies with seven
maturities: overnight, spot/next, one week, one month, two
months, three months, six months, and twelve months.3 These
rate reports were commenced in 1986 in response to the
creation of sophisticated new market instruments, including
interest rate swaps, foreign currency options, and forward rate
agreements.
The five currencies reported by Thomson Reuters include
the Swiss Francs, the Euro, the Pounds Sterling, the Japanese
Yen, and the US Dollars. 4
The LIBOR rates, however, were used to obtain profit for
financial institutions in a fraudulent manner rather than merely
to reflect a good faith estimate of perceived interest rates.
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THE LIBOR RATE BANK MANIPULATION
Trader and Bank Manipulations Discovered
In 2012, investigators for the United States CFTC and the
United Kingdom FSA discovered financial trader and bank
executive malfeasance before, during and after the 2007-2009
financial crises. Traders and bank executives acted together to
produce false LIBOR numbers. One financial trader joked and
offered favors, indicating that “Coffees will be coming your
way” with respect to an exchange for a manipulated number;
another trader stated he owed another trader ‘big time” for the
made up cost of borrowing funds and a third wrote himself to
“Ask for High 6M Fix.” The manipulations produced great
personal gain for the traders because even small fluctuations of
the LIBOR rates produce millions of dollars of gains for the
perpetrator daily. Bank executives in turn concealed the trader
operations because they feared a run on their banks if the
submissions indicated a higher than average borrowing rate.
Banks also had incentives to falsify the cost of borrowing
because a higher than average borrowing cost might signal
weakness on their balance sheets which, in turn would
exacerbate their difficulties. 5
In addition, the banks and their executives acted together to
falsify the LIBOR rate statements. Traders’ manipulations
affected the LIBOR rate to the extent of 1-2 basis points, but
the false submissions by banks affected the rates by 30-40 basis
points.6
The 2008 Geithner Warning
For a number of years prior to the 2012 public disclosure of
the rate manipulation, questions were raised concerning its
possibility. In testimony before the United States House of
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Representatives, Timothy Geithner, the then Secretary of the
Treasury, stated that he, as President of the Federal Reserve of
New York, warned British authorities in 2008 of possible
irregularities. In an email to Mervyn King, Governor of the
Bank of England, Geithner warned that the BBA should not
have the right to regulate LIBOR because that association was
not strong enough to oversee its rate setting methodology.
Geithner’s testimony stated: "In the detailed recommendations
we gave to the British, we identified a series of specific things
that would make it untenable for this rate to be affected by the
banks' incentive to lower their reported cost of funds. We gave
them very specific detailed changes for doing that. If those had
been adopted sooner, you would limit this risk going forward."
He further stated the reforming LIBOR had to be accomplished
internationally.7
Among the recommendations made by Geithner, with the
apparent concurrence of US banks, was the establishment and
publication of best practices by the BBA for calculating and
reporting rates including the requirement that external auditors
confirm adherence to these best practices and attest to the
accuracy of banks’ LIBOR rates. Geithner further suggested
the increase in size and the broadening of the composition of
the US Dollar panel with additional US banks on the panel
such as State Street, Northern Trust, and the Bank of New
York. He proposed a second US dollar LIBOR fixing for the
US market to capture rates when the US market is active.
Geithner recommended changes which included a) the
specification of transaction size which would be adjusted
flexibly over time so as to reflect significant changes in market
conditions; b) the reduction of the number of quoted maturities;
c) the report of only the LIBOR maturities for which there is a
direct benefit; and d) the elimination of the incentive to
misreport by randomly selecting a subset of 16 banks from
which the trimmed average rate would be calculated.8
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Secretary Geithner was criticized broadly by Congressional
Representatives for not revealing his concerns to the
committees of Congress. Representative Jeb Hensarling
claimed that Geithner treated the LIBOR manipulation “as a
curiosity, or something akin to jaywalking, as opposed to
highway robbery”. Other Representatives stated that,
notwithstanding LIBOR difficulties known to the Treasury
Department, the Federal Reserve continued to use LIBOR in a
number of financial rescue programs. Geithner defended his
role alleging: “We were in the position of investors all around
the world….” “We had to make a choice about what was the
best rate. It was a rate that was vulnerable to manipulation, but
we tried to initiate reform with the British.”9
The Bank of England confirmed that it had received the
Geithner communication in June 2008. The Bank alleged that it
had notified the BBA of the recommendations. The Bank also
noted that there were a number of emails between its staff and
the BBA, but apparently little or no action was taken as a result
of the suggestions made in the emails. Both the Bank of
England and the New York Federal Reserve Bank alleged that
they failed to act because they had no responsibility for
oversight of LIBOR which was left exclusively to the BBA.
The BBA claimed that it did publish a paper in November of
2008 which suggested changes in its governance structures and
disciplinary procedures as well as better scrutiny and analysis
in setting the rate.10The UK Parliament subsequently passed
the Financial Services Act of 2012, discussed below.

95 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

RESULTS OF THE LIBOR SCANDAL:
PROSECUTIONS, SUITS AND PLANS
Prosecutions
Barclays Bank:
The first casualty of the LIBOR scandal was the 300-yearold Barclays Bank (Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, and
Barclays Capital Inc.). After many complaints, the US
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a
June 27, 2012 Order settling the charges instituted against the
Bank. The Order noted that the Bank, since at least 2005,
repeatedly attempted to manipulate the rate and made false,
misleading or knowingly inaccurate submissions concerning
two global benchmark interest rates to the BBA and to the
European Banking Federation’s Interbank Offered Rate
(EURIBOR).11 According to the Order’s findings of fact,
Barclays' conduct involved multiple desks, traders, offices and
currencies, including the US Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the
Euro, and the Yen. Its daily LIBOR submissions were made at
the requests of the Bank’s swaps traders who attempted to
affect the official published LIBOR to benefit the Bank’s
derivatives trading positions. Its swaps traders coordinated with
and aided traders at other banks to influence LIBOR
submissions.12
The Order noted that, during the financial crisis of 20072009, Barclays lowered its LIBOR submissions in order to
manage perceived negative market perceptions that the Bank
had liquidity problems based on its high submissions in
comparison to lower submissions of other banks with respect to
the cost of borrowing unsecured funds. The Bank’s failure to
have proper supervision of its trading desks, especially that of
its swaps dealers, permitted senior managers to engage in false
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submissions. Barclays routinely based its LIBOR and
EURIBOR submissions on its traders’ requests, rather than
reflecting the actual cost of borrowing, in order to benefit the
Bank’s derivatives trading positions. It lowered its submissions
to reflect the lower costs of borrowing submitted by other
banks in an endeavor so as to not appear to be an outlier bank.
Barclays Bank consented to the imposition of a $200
million penalty by the CFTC as well as to $160 million penalty
to the Fraud Section of the US Department of Justice, and to
implement the following procedures:
• Make submissions based on specified factors with
Barclays’ transactions being given the greatest weight,
subject to specified adjustments and considerations;
• Implement
firewalls
to
prevent
improper
communications including between traders and
submitters;
• Prepare and retain certain documents concerning
submissions, and retain relevant communications;
• Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures
concerning its submissions and related processes;
• Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning
compliance with the terms of the Order;
• Use best efforts to encourage the development of
rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and
• Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.13
The scandal led to the replacement of its longstanding
senior executives including its Chairman, Marcus Agius, CEO
Bob Diamond, and COO Jerry Del Missier.14 The public and
governmental call for retribution may have made Barclays
Bank an easy target but, as noted below, it was not the only
bank to be punished for its wrongdoing.
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UBS (formerly Union Bank of Switzerland):
The largest bank in Switzerland, UBS, was ordered to pay
1.4 billion Swiss francs (US $1.5 billion) to US, UK, and Swiss
regulators for its involvement in the rate-rigging scandal
concerning LIBOR submissions. These penalties amount to
three times those imposed upon Barclays Bank. 15 The sum
includes £160 million ($260 million) to the UK FSA, and 59
million francs in estimated profits to the Swiss Financial
Market Supervisory Authority. The UK financial regulator
found some 2,000 documented requests by UBS traders to alter
interest borrowing rate submissions involving 45 or more bank
personnel over a 6-year period. The UBS employees worked
with interdealer brokers whom they bribed to manipulate Yen
LIBOR submissions by other banks. The UBS traders were
able to have other persons submit higher and lower rates to
LIBOR to benefit their proprietary trading positions. The UBS
branch in Japan pled guilty to one count of wire fraud for
manipulation of the Yen LIBOR. Its operation in Japan was
only modestly affected in that it paid a fine equal to about its
three weeks revenue in Japan. The Japanese UBS operation
was also prohibited in participating in the Tokyo interbank
derivative market for a week, and had to strengthen its
compliance and internal controls.16
The FSA also noted one specific example in which a UBS
trader agreed with a fellow trader that he would attempt to
manipulate UBS’s submissions in small drops in order to avoid
arousing suspicion of regulators. The trader stated: “if you keep
6s [6 month JPY LIBOR rate] unchanged today…I will f…ing
do one humongous deal with you… Like a 50,000 buck deal,
whatever…I need you to keep it as low as possible…if you do
that…I’ll pay you, you know, 50,000 dollars, 100,000
dollars…whatever you want…I’m a man of my word.”17
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Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS):
In a situation similar to the UBS controversy above, the UK
FSA, the US CFTC and the US Department of Justice fined
RBS £290 million ($610 million) for its manipulative practices.
The sum was to be paid from moneys taken back from paid
bonuses and future bonuses of executives of the Bank. RBS
traders colluded with other traders in London, Singapore,
Tokyo, and elsewhere to fix LIBOR rates in hundreds of trades
involving the Japanese Yen and Swiss francs from 2006-2010.
The prosecution of RBS was based on its failure to have and
enforce compliance measures to detect and prevent fraudulent
activity. Investigators noted that derivatives traders and
submitters worked together at the same desk thereby
facilitating potential conflicts of interest. The fine was
significantly lower than that imposed on UBS because 82
percent of its shares are owned by the British government.18
Investigators also noted that other banks on the LIBOR panel
were engaged in rate manipulation.19
Rabobank (Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank
B.A).:
In October, 2013, US and European regulators fined
Rabobank of the Netherlands the sum of €774 million ($1
billion) for alleged manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR
currency rates by some 30 staff members. The bank was also
found to have manipulated the Yen LIBOR causing it to close
it Tokyo’s offices leaving only a representative branch therein.
The regulators noted that the bank had filed to act in the light
of one of its employees having told an internal audit group of
yen manipulations in 2009. In 2006, a Rabobank derivatives
trader on a number of occasions asked the bank’s money
market desk in London that supervised rate submitters for rates
favoring his position. The desk head of the London office said
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to the trader that “I am fast turning into your LIBOR bitch.”20
In addition, a criminal information was filed in the US District
Court for the District of Columbia charging the bank with wire
fraud for the said rate manipulation but deferred prosecution
pending the bank’s cooperation with the Department of Justice
in its ongoing investigation of LIBOR manipulation.21
Additional Investigations:
The LIBOR scandal has resulted in investigations of
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, ICAP, and JP Morgan
Chase. A financial trader at Citigroup in the Bank’s Tokyo
office, for example, needed assistance with respect to the
Japanese Yen. He contacted a RBS broker-trader and asked for
an artificially low LIBOR estimate of the Yen for the next day.
The Citigroup trader indicated his appreciation for any favors
in this regard, and the RBS trader responded affirmatively.
That message and other similar type messages led prosecutors
in the US to indict the Citigroup trader for conspiracy, wire
fraud, and other charges. He was also arrested in England at a
later date. The Japanese Services Agency suspended briefly
Citigroup’s Global Markets Group from Yen trading. JP
Morgan Chase and the Bank of America are presently under
investigation by the US, UK, Canadian, Swiss, and other
financial regulators.22
The UK Financial Conduct Authority stated in December,
2013 that it will also fine individual traders from a half dozen
firms including Barclays of more than £100,000 ($US
$160,000). Traders contesting the fines may have their cases
heard by the Authority’s internal tribunal. A former UBS
trader, Tom Hayes, who had been scheduled to enter a plea of
guilty in a London court instead decided to enter a “Not
Guilty” plea with two other traders. His trial is scheduled for
January, 2015. In December, 2013, the US Department of
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Justice indicted Hayes concerning LIBOR rate manipulations
by conspiring with employees of JPMorgan Chase, HSCH,
RBS, and ICAP.23
Civil Litigation
The United Kingdom:
The criminal fines imposed on Barclays Bank, described
above, were only the beginning of its financial difficulties
rather than the end of its financial exposure. Guardian Care
Homes commenced a lawsuit for £70 million (US $113
million) concerning the alleged miss-selling of interest rate
hedging products based on LIBOR rates.24 London’s Court of
Appeals ruled in August, 2013 that its lawsuit against the
Barclays Bank, which was the first bank to acknowledge rate
manipulation, as well as a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank by
India’s Unitech, could proceed to trial.25 This admission has
led some commentators to demand equal investigation and
enforcement against other banks which similarly colluded to
artificially set LIBOR.
The United States:
There are pending US civil lawsuits, including a class
action brought in August 2012 on behalf of investors in Alaska,
Wyoming, North Dakota, and some 20 other states. The March
29, 2013 Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York decision, In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments
Antitrust Litigation, however, indicated that a number of
difficulties may arise in civil actions against the financial
institutions and their senior executives for LIBOR
manipulation alleged injuries.26
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The federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
assigned District Court Judge Naomi Buchwald to coordinate
and consolidate pretrial proceedings with respect to a number
of civil lawsuits commenced nationally involving LIBOR
manipulation. The defendants had filed motions to dismiss with
respect to the four categories of plaintiffs: (1) over-the-counter
traders; (2) exchange-based traders; (3) bondholders; and (4)
the Charles Schwab company. All but the fourth were class
action plaintiffs. A stay was entered by the court with respect
to all new complaints pending its decision.
The court addressed the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The
complaints alleging federal antitrust violations were dismissed
for failure to establish “antitrust injury” defined as “an injury
that results from an anticompetitive aspect of defendants’
conduct.” Although the plaintiffs had alleged that the
defendants conspired to suppress LIBOR over a three-year
period causing injury to the plaintiffs, nevertheless, they failed
to allege that the injuries resulted from any harm to
competition. Bank submissions to LIBOR were not in
themselves competitive and the plaintiffs failed to allege that
the conduct of the defendants had an anticompetitive effect in
any market in which the defendants compete.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ complaint of market
manipulation, the court determined that the plaintiffs had
adequately pleaded their claims, and would not be dismissed
for failure to state a course of action. But the claims were timebarred because there were numerous articles published in April
and May of 2008 in prominent publications that should have
made the plaintiffs aware of the defendants’ commodities
manipulation claims that were based on contracts entered into
between August 2007 and May 29, 2008. Plaintiffs’ claims for
contracts entered into between April 15, 2009 and May, 2010

2014 / The Libor Scandal / 102

may or may not survive the statute of limitations pending
further amendment to their complaints.
Plaintiffs’ complaints concerning RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act)27 violations were
dismissed. The predicate acts of mail and wire fraud could
have been part of a claim for securities fraud and would thus be
barred by the PSLRA (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995).28 Because the fraudulent actions alleged took place in
England, RICO would not be applicable; the Act applies only
to domestic enterprises. The additional complaints alleging
state-law claims alleging antitrust violations were also
dismissed for lack of antitrust injury as well as the exchangebased New York common law unjust enrichment because the
plaintiffs failed to allege any relationship between them and the
defendants.
Assuming the decision is not reversed on appeal in whole or
in part, it appears that civil litigation claims will have
substantial difficulties in overcoming motions to dismiss,
including due to statute of limitations difficulties.
Plans
Suggested Rate Setting Mechanisms:
A number of alternative suggestions for the replacement of
LIBOR have arisen:
•

Members of the European Repo Council consisting of
a number of the leading banks globally, including
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, requested the
European Central Bank to find a new way of
calculating interest rates for inter-bank unsecured
loans. The Council suggested that the Central Bank set
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•

•

up a benchmark based on actual “secured market”
trades (bonds and other assets used as security for
loans). The secured market alternative to the unsecured
interbank market should be used to set the price for
trillions of euros for financial products including home
loans and derivatives.29
The former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve
Board, Ben Bernanke, in testimony before United
States Congressional committees, suggested two
market-determined replacement alternatives, namely
(1) use of repo rates, i.e., repurchase agreements
defined as collateralized lending transactions whereby
one party agrees to sell securities to a second party
against a transfer of funds while the other party agrees
to repurchase the said or equivalent securities at a
specific price in the future;30 or (2) Overnight Interest
Swap (OIS) rates between banks, which exchange an
overnight interest rate for a short-term interest rate.31
The former Chairman of the US CFTC, Gary Gensler,
stated that the current international financial
benchmark for setting rates on mortgages, car loans,
and futures market trading is not sustainable. He
quoted Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of
England who said of LIBOR in 2008: “It is, in many
ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each
other.” Gensler noted that there has been a significant
structural change in the manner in which market
participants finance their balance sheets and trading
positions, from borrowing unsecured toward
borrowings that are secured by posting collateral. The
2008 financial crisis and the 2010 debt crisis and the
downgrading of banks’ ratings have cause unsecured
borrowings to diminish substantially. Basel III
international capital rules, which now include an asset
correlation factor that requires additional capital when
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•
•

•

a bank is exposed to another bank, have also reduced
outlays for unsecured borrowings. Coupled with the
revelations of bank manipulations, Gensler suggested
that it is time to undertake possible alternative
mechanisms which include overnight index swaps
rates, benchmark rates based on actual short-term
collateralized financing, or a new standard based on
government borrowing rates.32
Use of the Eurodollar rate which is published daily by
the Federal Reserve Board as published by Bloomberg
ICAP Eurodollar screen at 9:30 A.M. EST.33
Rates based on actual trades rather than estimates.
Those opposed to such computations allege that many
banks cannot borrow from other banks and thus there
are no LIBOR transactions. Three-to-six month
transactions are virtually impossible for certain
currencies.34
Additional alternatives for determining rates for
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) include the linking
of ARMS to Treasuries; “effective” federal funds rate;
and general collateral finance repurchase agreements.35

United Kingdom Legislative Action – The Financial Services
Act of 2012:
The revelations of impropriety in the LIBOR rate setting
mechanism brought about UK Parliamentary action. At the
behest of the Chancellor, The Financial Services Act of 2012
was enacted. The then existing Financial Services Authority
(FSA) was abolished and replaced by a single financial
services regulator and two new regulatory bodies, to wit, the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), a subsidiary of the
Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The effective date of the transition is April 1, 2013.36 The
purposes for the new Authorities are to “carry forward our
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philosophy of outcomes-based regulation, intensive firm
supervision and credible deterrence.”37 The role of the PRA is
to regulate the UK financial system of all deposit-taking
institutions and investment banks. The FCA’s role is to
regulate the wholesale and retail financial markets and their
infrastructure and all financial firms not regulated by the
PRA.38 Martin Wheatley, the Chief Executive of FCA,
produced an 85 page Wheatley Review final report concerning
the LIBOR system and concluded that the system should
continue. 39
•
•
•

LIBOR should be reformed rather than replaced as a
benchmark;
Transaction data should be explicitly used to support
LIBOR submissions; and
Market participants should continue to play a
significant role in the production and oversight of
LIBOR.40

Transfer of Oversight of LIBOR:
As a result of the failure of the British Bankers’ Association
to regulate LIBOR and the recommendations of the Wheatley
Review, oversight of LIBOR was transferred from the BBA to
a regulator to oversee the rates set forth by the BBA.41
Will reforming LIBOR instead of replacing it resolve the
problem of rate manipulation? At least one commentator
observed that, by the continued use of LIBOR setters by banks,
the FCA will simply discard submissions it deems too high or
too low and inadvertently create a rate manipulation of its own
making, and subject to possible future manipulation. The
increased layer of rate inspection, however, by a non-industry
party will certainly produce some guards against fraudulent
manipulations.42
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CONCLUSION
In a 2014 Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Global
Market Sentiment Survey of more than 6,500 members, more
than half of its members (54 percent) believed that there was a
failure of an ethical culture within financial firms. This failure
has led to a lack of trust in the industry. A majority of members
believed that there should be increased global coordination to
monitor systemic risks to avoid future financial crises; greater
transparency respecting trades;
improved
corporate
governance; and adherence to governmental rules and
regulations.43
The world of finance is immensely complicated. Even socalled sophisticated investors lack sufficient knowledge of
derivatives, swaps, and other instruments of finance. It is
difficult to comprehend that reputable international banks and
financial institutions have engaged in rate manipulation almost
without fear of discovery. Their malfeasance has consisted
alternatively of corporate decisions to manipulate rates to boost
their standing; by their failure to have safeguards against
manipulation; or by their failure to supervise rogue employees
who were able to profit extensively by such manipulation.
Scandals in the financial industry continue to abound:
corporate ratings organizations such as Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings have allegedly given higher than
merited ratings to corporate financial institutions in order to
receive their business. The result of these and other scandals
precipitated the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act44 and other
national and international legislation, including regulatory
investigations by affected government commissions. These
investigations and their resulting fines have in turn
substantially raised the costs of providing financial services.
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Unfortunately, the LIBOR scandal was revealed after the
promulgation of Dodd-Frank and thus had no specific
provisions relating to the scandal. At best, the Act expanded
the powers of the US CFTC in its regulations of derivatives. It
is highly unlikely that Dodd-Frank will be amended to cover
the additional manifestations of the LIBOR scandal. The House
of Representatives, in fact, has sought to repeal the Act.45
Financial institutions complain extensively of being
overburdened by governmental regulations. But unless they
collectively and individually act responsibly, governments
have little choice other than greater oversight and prosecution
for such malfeasance.
Although the task presents great challenges, the ordered
enforcement of national and international antifraud regulation
must occur. The United Kingdom Financial Services Act, the
extension of Dodd Frank to govern disclosure of LIBOR rate
setting and continuing national and international initiatives to
enforce due diligence in the setting of these rates are absolutely
necessary to avoid illegal actions which affect individual
persons and corporate entities. Suggested rate setting
mechanisms must be continually revised and diligently
enforced.
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